Abstract I construct a model in which money and bond holdings are consistent with individual decisions and aggregate variables such as production and interest rates. The agents are infinitely-lived, have constant-elasticity preferences, and receive a fraction of their income in money. Each agent solves a Baumol-Tobin money management problem. Markets are segmented because financial frictions make agents trade bonds for money at different times. Trading frequency, consumption, government decisions and prices are mutually consistent. An increase in inflation, for example, implies higher trading frequency, more bonds sold to account for seigniorage, and lower real balances.
Introduction
Aggregate variables such as the money-income ratio depend on individual decisions.
Here, I combine the general equilibrium Baumol-Tobin models of Jovanovic (1982) and Romer (1986) with the market segmentation models of Grossman and Weiss (1983) , Rotemberg (1984) , and Grossman (1987) to connect individual decisions to variables used in monetary policy. The objective is to create a framework to analyze consumption, prices, and money taking into account the changes in the individual demands for money.
I use two features from the models above. I obtain the demands for money from an inventory model of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) in general equilibrium, as Jovanovic and Romer (other general equilibrium Baumol-Tobin models are in Fusselman and Grossman 1989 , Heathcote 1998 , Chiu 2007 , and Rodriguez-Mendizabal 2006 . And I express individual optimization problems as in the market segmentation models of Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg. As a result, agents trade bonds for money at different times, now with the trading frequency obtained in equilibrium.
In addition to combining the two frameworks, I make two changes from the models above. First, the model has infinitely-lived agents and consumption smoothing while Jovanovic assumes constant consumption and Romer assumes zero intertemporal discount and overlapping generations. I consider consumption smoothing because it affects the demand for money and the welfare cost of inflation. Infinite-lived agents, on the other hand, remove the influence of the length of life of each generation on equilibrium variables. In particular, consumption and money over time after policy changes are not affected by the length of each generation. Infinite lives and consumption smoothing, moreover, facilitate comparison with cash-in-advance models such as the models of Lucas and Stokey (1987) , and Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991) .
Second, I let agents receive a fraction of income in money within holding periods. I allow a fraction of income in money because market segmentation implies large holding periods to match data on velocity (Edmond and Weill 2008) , holding periods of six months or larger. As traditional Baumol-Tobin models implicitly assume that agents receive their income in interest-bearing bonds (Karni 1973) , large holding periods would make agents separated from their income for a long period. Therefore, I follow and Khan and Thomas (2010) and assume that agents receive part of their income in bonds and the remaining in money. The fraction of income in money is thought to be substantial, sixty percent for example, and interpreted as labor income.
The result is a monetary model in which trading periods, consumption and the distribution of money holdings are consistent with individual decisions and aggregate
variables. An increase in inflation, for example, implies higher trading frequency, more bonds sold to account for seigniorage, and lower real balances. Silva (2009, forthcoming) uses the model to study the effects of interest rate shocks and the welfare cost of inflation. Even with the modifications made here, the model allows its steady state to be characterized analytically.
Having the frequency of trades chosen optimally, as in the model, implies a better fit with the data on money and interest rates. The demand for money, for example, has an interest elasticity of −0.5 and semi-elasticity of −12.5. The interest elasticity is approximately zero, in contrast, with fixed holding periods (Romer 1986 and Grossman 1987) . The choice of the interval between trades makes easier for agents to change their demand for money.
The Model
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents with measure one. There is an asset market and a goods market. The asset market concentrates trades between bonds and money and the goods market concentrates the trades between goods and money.
Only money can be used to buy goods. The government sets government consumption and taxes and controls the supply of money through open market operations.
The financial frictions appear when agents transfer resources between the asset market and the goods market. Each agent has a brokerage account and a bank account, as in Alvarez et al. (2002 . The brokerage account is used to manage the activities in the asset market and the bank account to manage the activities in the goods market. The financial frictions are represented by a transfer cost Γ in real terms that the agents need to pay whenever they transfer resources between the brokerage account and the bank account. The transfer cost is paid with the resources in the brokerage account and it does not depend on the volume transferred. Γ represents a fixed cost of portfolio adjustment.
Time is continuous, t ≥ 0. Time is continuous to avoid integer constraints on the decision of the time to make transfers. At t = 0, each agent has M 0 in money in the bank account and B 0 in bonds in the brokerage account. There is a given distribution F of M 0 and B 0 . Index agents by their initial holdings of money and
Each agent is composed of three participants, a worker, a trader, and a shopper, as in Lucas (1990) . At the beginning of each period, the worker engages in the production and sales of the consumption good, the trader goes to the asset market to manage the brokerage account, and the shopper goes to the goods market to buy consumption goods. At the end of each period, the three participants rejoin to share the consumption good.
The flow of funds occurs in the following way. The worker produces Y (t) goods and sells the production for money to other agents in the goods market by the price P (t). After the sale, the worker transfers aP (t) Y (t) to the bank account and
(1 − a) P (t) Y (t) to the brokerage account. The trader trades bonds and money with the resources of the brokerage account. The trades can be made with other traders or with the government in open market operations. If it is necessary to make a transfer from the brokerage account to the bank account, the trader sells the necessary quantity of bonds and makes the transfer. In the same way, the trader can make transfers from the bank account to the brokerage account. As the money deposited in the brokerage account cannot be used to buy goods and does not receive interest, the money in the brokerage account is immediately used to buy bonds. The shopper uses the available money in the bank account to buy goods in the goods market.
The shopper then brings the goods purchased to the other participants to be shared among then in the end of the period.
In Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) , the agents have access to money only when they pay the financial costs to convert bonds into money. This case is obtained here with a = 0. Then, all sales are converted into bonds and the shopper can only use the sales proceeds to buy goods after a transfer from the brokerage account to the bank account. The introduction of a fraction a > 0 allows the shopper to use part of the sales proceeds immediately. To simplify, the transfers of the worker to the trader and to the shopper do not pay the financial costs. Only the transfers between the brokerage account and the bank account pay the financial costs.
Agent s decides consumption c(t, s), the times to make transfers T j (s), j = 1, 2, ..., money and bond holdings in the bank and brokerage account, M(t, s), B(t, s), and the transfers of money between the two accounts, z (t, s). The worker, the trader, and the shopper are together represented as agent s. Let T 0 (s) ≡ 0. T 0 is not a decision variable. If an agent decides to make the first transfer at t = 0, then T 1 (s) = 0. A holding period is given by (T j , T j+1 ).
Let r (t) denote the nominal interest rate at time t. If there is not a transfer at t, bond holdings in the brokerage account evolve aṡ
whereẋ is the derivative of x with respect to time. If there are no transfers, the agent simply accumulates the interest rate and the income from sales. Bond holdings in the brokerage account increase.
Let B − (T j (s) , s) represent bond holdings just before a transfer at t = T j and
If there is a positive transfer to the bank account,
In this case, bond holdings in the brokerage account decrease just after the transfer.
Money holdings in the bank account folloẇ
during a holding period. If there are no transfers, money holdings decrease with goods purchases and increase with the income transfers from sales. The shopper can use the money transferred from the worker to buy goods in the same period. Analogously to the definitions for bond holdings, let
money holdings just after a transfer and money holdings just before a transfer. We
. If the transfer is positive then
whereṀ (T j (s) , s) + is the right derivative of M (t, s) with respect to time at t = T j (s) and c + (T j (s) , s) is consumption just after the transfer. Notice that the government does not distribute money directly to agents with, for example, lump-sum transfers.
Only those agents in the asset market, trading bonds for money, have access to the transfers of money from the government.
The agents make transfers so that M + (T j (s) , s) covers the purchases during (T j ,
The agent has to use M 0 until the first transfer, at T 1 (s). For the first holding period (0,
we have
It can be the case that the agent chooses to make the first transfer at t = 0. For example, if a = 0 and M 0 = 0. In this case, T 1 (s) = 0, and M − (0, s) = 0.
Let Q (t) denote the price at time zero of a bond that pays one dollar at time t.
Given the nominal interest rate r (t), Q (t) = e −R(t) , where
for the different holding periods, together with the condition lim t→∞ Q (t) B (t) = 0, we obtain the constraint on the brokerage account in present value,
where
The problem of agent s is then to obtain c (t, s), M (t, s), and T j (s) to solve
subject to (3)- (7) and to T j+1 (s) ≥ T j (s) and M (t, s) ≥ 0. ρ is the intertemporal rate of discount. The utility function is u (c) =
, η 6 = 1, η > 0; and u (c) = log c, η = 1. The transfer cost does not enter in the utility function. η is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
It is never optimal to set
the agent maintained money holdings in the bank account during the whole holding period (T j , T j+1 ) without receiving interest. The agent is always better off reducing the amount transferred at
For the other holding periods,
Therefore, using (3), the demand for money at t of agent s is given
The transfer cost rules out an equilibrium with a representative agent. In a standard cash-in-advance model, agents have access to bonds and to their income in the end of every period. Here, agents have access to their bonds and to their income deposited in bonds only when they sell bonds for money. At every moment, some agents sell part of their bonds for money and make a transfer while others accumulate bonds and keep using money in the bank account until the next transfer.
To make the budget constraints linear in income, let Γ = γY (t). As preferences are homothetic, this implies that optimal consumption and that the demand for money are linear in income. A demand for money linear in income, that is, income elasticity equal to one, agrees with the empirical evidence as discussed, among others, by Meltzer (1963) , Lucas (2000) .
Let B G 0 denote the supply of government bonds at t = 0. Consider first a situation with no taxes and no government consumption. In this case, all seigniorage collected by the government is redistributed to agents as initial bonds. The government budget
dt, where M (t) is the aggregate money supply.
Higher money growth implies higher B G 0 and more bonds distributed across agents. The market clearing conditions for money and bonds are
and
The market clearing condition for goods takes into account the goods used to pay the transfer cost. Let A (t, δ) ≡ {s :
the set of agents that make a transfer during [t, t + δ]. The number of goods during
[t, t + δ] to pay the transfer cost is then given by R
ΓdF (s). Taking the limit to obtain the number of goods used at time t yields that the market clearing condition for goods is given by
An equilibrium is defined as prices
and T j (s) solve the maximization problem (8) given P (t) and Q (t) for all t ≥ 0 and s in the support of F ; (ii) the government budget constraint holds; and (iii) the market clearing conditions for money, bonds, and goods hold.
Solving the model
Focus on the steady state, an equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate is constant at r, the inflation rate is constant at π, and aggregate consumption grows at the same rate of output. Let output grow at the rate g, Y (t) = Y 0 e gt , where ρ > g (1 − 1/η). I look for an equilibrium in which all agents have the same consumption pattern within holding periods and the same interval between transfers N. The steady state is interpreted as the allocations and prices of an economy that has not been exposed to shocks for a long time.
Rewrite the maximization problem in terms of the consumption-income ratioĉ (t, n) ≡ c (t, n) /Y (t).ĉ (t, n) decreases at a constant rate within holding periods, according to r and η. We can then writeĉ (t, n) for the entire holding period as a function of its value at the beginning of a holding period. With the exception of the short holding period from t = 0 to the first transfer, let the steady state be such that all agents begin a holding period with the same consumption-income ratio,ĉ 0 .
At a certain time t,ĉ (t, n) varies across agents because each agent is in a different position in the holding period. But all agents look the same within holding periods.
They start with the same consumption-income ratio and it decreases at a common rate. As the maximization problem can be written in terms of the consumptionincome ratio, having the sameĉ 0 implies that all agents choose the same interval between transfers N . Let n represent the time of the first transfer, n ∈ [0, N).
Therefore, an agent n makes transfers at n, n + N and so on.
As aggregate consumption grows at the same rate of aggregate output, the same number of agents must be starting a new holding period at every time. Otherwise, aggregate consumption would vary over time. As a result, the distribution of agents is uniform along [0, N), with density 1/N .
1
The first order condition with respect to consumption implies c (t, n) = e −(ρ+π)ηt
.., using P (t) = P 0 e πt , and where λ (n) is the Lagrange multiplier of (7). Set the nominal interest rate in the steady state at r = ρ + g/η + π.
The first order condition then impliesċ (t, n) /c (t, n) = −ηr + g and thatĉ (t, n) decreases at the rate ηr.
If η, r or a are high, then agents would consume more in the beginning of holding periods by borrowing against their money receipts within the same holding period.
They would consume less than aY in the end of a holding periods. A useful property of the model is that c > aY for the empirically relevant range of η, r, and a. That is, for η between zero and five, r between zero to 16% per year, and a ≤ 0.6. This is the empirically relevant range of η, r, and a because the usual estimates of η are 1 For a proof that the only distribution of agents compatible with a steady state in which agents have the same consumption pattern is the uniform distribution, see Grossman (1985) . Grossman (1985 Grossman ( , 1987 
The market clearing holds for every
The effect of the transfer cost is apparent in the term γ/N . As we must take into account γ/N , the consumption-income ratio can be less than 1 during the entire holding period. With transfer cost in utility terms, γ/N disappears andĉ 0 > 1.
The effect of γ through the market clearing condition would not be considered. The expression of N, given in proposition 1 below, implies N > γ. So,ĉ 0 > 0.
The first order conditions for T j (n), j = 2, 3, ..., imply
The left hand side and the right hand side are the marginal gain and loss of delaying T j . The marginal gain is given first by postponing the transfer cost and second by decreasing balances from T j to T j+1 ; the third term is the net effect of increasing [T j−1 , T j ) and decreasing [T j , T j+1 ), this effect is zero when η = 1. The right hand side is given by the loss in utility caused by the increase in T j , and by the net effect of the money receipts within the holding period. We obtain N with (9), r = ρ + g/η + π, and the expression ofĉ (t, n).
Proposition 1
The optimal interval between transfers N is the positive root of
for η 6 = 1, and (10)
. N exists and is unique for all positive a that satisfiesĉ 0 e −ηrN ≥ a and all positive values of γ, η, ρ, g, and r.
With the value of N, we find all optimal trading periods T j (n), n ∈ [0, N), as agents trade at n, n + N and so on. With γ in utility terms,ĉ 0 disappears for a = 0 from (10) and (11). As discussed above,ĉ (t) ≥ a (and soĉ 0 e −ηrN ≥ a) for the empirically relevant cases.
The formulas were arranged to facilitate the identification of the terms
, where x ≥ 0 in the formulas if η ≥ 1, π ≥ 0, and g ≥ 0. In particular, With the value of N, the output growth rate g, and the fact that agents consume at the rate −ηr + g within holding periods, we obtain M 0 (n) and W 0 (n) such that the economy is in the steady state from t = 0 and on. The growth rate g is used to write consumption just after a transfer. The consumption-income ratioĉ 0 at the beginning of holding periods after t = T 1 (n) is the same for all agents in the steady state. The value ofĉ (0, n) differs across agents because the holding period that initiates at t = 0 has different lengths, according to n ∈ [0, N). We have c
consumption at the beginning of holding periods grows at the rate g. Proposition 3
gives the values of M 0 (n). As we don't need B 0 (n) to discuss the demand for money, the values of B 0 (n) are in the proof of proposition 3, in the appendix.
Proposition 3 The initial money holdings such that the economy is in a steady state
and N is given by proposition (1).
An agent with M 0 (n) makes transfers at t = n, n + N, and so on. Asĉ 0 e −ηrN > a, M 0 (n) increases with n. So, agents that make the first transfer later have more initial money holdings. Analogously, the initial value in the brokerage account B 0 (n) decreases with n. If an agent makes the first trade of bonds for money soon (n small),
Although the distribution of agents along [0, N) is uniform, with density f (n) = 
The distribution of real money holdings is concentrated on small quantities of money, but it is close to a uniform. The distribution is more concentrated on small quantities of money if η increases.
2
We obtain the aggregate demand for money with
The aggregate money-income ratio m (r), the inverse of velocity, is obtained by dividing
where N is given by proposition 1 andĉ 0 (r, N)
Notice that g does not affect the money-income ratio if η = 1. A fraction a of income received directly as money means, in practice, that the agents need to hold less money to buy goods. So, m decreases with a. The aggregate money-income ratio is a function of the interest rate r and also of preference parameters, financial technology, and output growth. I write m (r) to emphasize the relation of the money-income ratio to the interest rate. . The interest elasticity of m is, therefore, close to the interest elasticity of N, −0.5. Lucas (2000) argues that an interest elasticity of −0.5 provides a good fit to the data. Money-income ratio, m(r)
Nominal interest rate (% p.a.) Fig. 1. m(r) and U.S. data, 1900-1997 (M1/(PY) for the money-income ratio and commercial paper rate for the nominal interest rate, the data points indicate years). η = 1 (log utility). I set a = 0.6, as and Khan and Thomas (2010) , who interpret a as labor income. The only parameter left is γ, which I set to γ = 1.265%. γ is set so that m (r) passes through the historical average of the data, that is, m (r) equals the historical money-income ratio whenr is the historical interest rate, obtained with their geometric means. This is the same procedure of Lucas (2000) . Similarly, and Khan and Thomas (2010) calibrate their models to fit the historical M2 velocity. I simplified the model to facilitate its application: the objective is to create a framework to study changes in monetary policy taking into account the frictions to manage money holdings and a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings. In particular, m (r) is stable with constant γ and constant financial market participation.
Following Reynard (2004) we can obtain a stable m (r) with decreasing γ (financial innovation) together with increasing financial market participation. It simplifies, however, to have constant γ and financial market participation. As figure 1 shows, these assumptions imply a close match with the data. Another simplification is to impose that agents need money to buy goods through a cash-in-advance constraint instead of obtaining a demand for money from matching as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , and Lagos and Wright (2005) . Moreover, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Ireland (2009) point out that the demand for money changes with low interest rates. The model is intended to be used with moderate interest rates, in the range of the interest rates of figure 1, for which m (r) follow the general pattern of the data.
With taxes and government consumption, the government budget constraint changes to
where G is government consumption and τ is a lump-sum tax. The total supply of government bonds is still given by
With lump-sum taxes and a as the fraction in money of gross income, each agent transfers to the brokerage account On the other hand, an increase in G financed with seigniorage increases inflation.
The change in inflation implies an additional decrease in consumption because the frequency of trading increases and so the resources devoted to financial transactions increase. In a model with fixed N, financing G with taxes or seigniorage would yield similar results. Seigniorage would still increase inflation, but the effect on consumption would be restricted to consumption smoothing within holding periods. Here, the increase in the frequency of trades further affects consumption.
Conclusions
This paper introduces a model to study how changes in monetary policy such as changes in the interest rate or in the money supply affect prices and the real demand for money. The distribution of money holdings, prices, interest rates, production and government actions are consistent in equilibrium. That is, they are consistent with market clearing conditions, budget constraints and individual maximization.
The model combines the Baumol-Tobin general equilibrium frameworks of Jovanovic (1982) and Romer (1986) with the market segmentation models of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984) . The result is a cash-in-advance model in which the length of the time period is optimal and money holdings are heterogeneous.
Some applications of the model are to study how changes in the trading frequency affect the demand for money and the welfare cost of inflation. Taking into account the changes in the trading frequency, Silva (forthcoming) shows that the estimates of the welfare cost of inflation increase substantially. More generally, the model is useful to study how the adjustment of money holdings affects real variables.
Appendix -Proofs
I will use the following functions and definitions in propositions 1, 2 and 3: Proposition 1. Proof. The first order conditions for T j , j = 2, 3, of agent n are e −ρT j u (c − (T j )) − e −ρT j u (c
T j aP (t) Y e gt dt−Y e gT j P (T j ) a(Q (T j )−Q (T j−1 ))
−γY e gT j (P (T j )Q (T j ) + Q (T j )Ṗ (T j )) − Y γge gT j P (T j ) Q (T j )] = 0. The first order conditions for consumption yield e −ρT j c − (T j ) −1/η = λQ (T j−1 ) P (T j ) and e −ρT j × c + (T j ) −1/η = λQ (T j ) P (T j ). In the steady state, Q (t) = e −rt and P (t) = P 0 e πt , N j = N, and c (t) =ĉ (t) Y 0 e gt . Substituting and simplifying yields γ(r − π − g) + £ĉ + (T j ) − e rNĉ− (T j ) ¤ =ĉ
T jĉ 
T j e (g+π−ηr)(t−T j ) dt = (r − π − g)γ + a(e rN − 1) − ra R T j+1
T j e (g+π)(t−T j ) dt. Solving the integrals and rearranging yields (10). Note that r = ρ + g/η + π. The steps for η = 1 are analogous.
For existence and uniqueness, the strategy is to show that G is increasing in N, with That is, consumption in the end of a holding period is higher than or equal to the money receipts. This condition is satisfied because of the constraint c (t, n) ≥ aY (t).
As discussed in the text, in any case, we always have c (t, n) > aY (t), nonbinding, for the empirically relevant parameters. For η = 1, analogously, G N > 0. Therefore, G crosses the zero and, as it is increasing, it crosses the zero only once.
The unique N * is such that G (N * ) = 0.¥ c 0 e gT j (n) e −(ηr−g)(t−T j ) and T j (n) = n + (j − 1) N. Substituting and solving yields P ∞ j=1 Q (T j ) M + (T j (n)) = P 0 Y 0 Ne −(ρ−g(1−1/η))n 1−e −(ρ−g(1−1/η))N [ĉ 0 f (x 2 ) − ag (y 2 )]. Similarly, we have P ∞ j=1 Q (T j ) P (T j ) γY (t) = P 0 Y 0 γe −(ρ−g(1−1/η))n 1−e −(ρ−g(1−1/η))N . Initial bond holdings B 0 (n) can then be obtained with the definition of W 0 (n).¥
